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RENDELL, District Judge: 
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  This appeal is from a judgment of sentence imposed 
after defendant David George Brannan pled guilty to one count of 
being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  Brannan raises two grounds in his appeal. 
First, he argues that the district court improperly enhanced the 
offense level by four levels under § 2K2.1(b)(5) of the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines for the use, possession or transfer 
of a firearm in connection with another felony.  See United 
States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §§ 2K2.1(b)(5) 
(1994) (hereinafter "U.S.S.G.").0  Second, he contends that the 
district court failed to properly apply § 5G1.3 of the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines so as to have his federal sentence 
run concurrently with a state court sentence he was serving.  See 
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c) (Policy Statement) (hereinafter "U.S.S.G. 
§5G1.3(c)").  We find the second ground for attack to be valid, 
and, accordingly, we will remand for resentencing consistent with 
this opinion.0 
                     
0We apply the 1994 edition of the Sentencing Guidelines pursuant 
to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11 which dictates that the version of the 
Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing is to be used. 
Brannan was sentenced on February 10, 1995. 
 
0
 The amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines effective 
November 1, 1995 substantially rewrite U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c) and 
the Commentary thereto.  While the amendments do not affect this 
Court's analysis, the district court in resentencing would 
normally apply the Guideline in effect at the time of 
resentencing.  See United States v. Kopp, 951 F.2d 521, 534 (3d 
Cir. 1991).  However, if the district court determines that using 
the amended Guideline would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of 
the United States Constitution in that it would yield a harsher 
result, then it must apply the Guideline in effect at the time 
the offense was committed.  See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11; see also Kopp, 
951 F.2d at 526. 
4 
  The events giving rise to the instant offense involved 
the accidental discharge of a gun while it was being removed from 
the trunk of a car in western Pennsylvania.  Brannan testified 
that he was interested in selling the gun; he and a friend, Peter 
Andrulat, traveled on Friday evening, September 11, 1992, to a 
neighboring town because Andrulat believed that his friend, 
Richard Hopkins, would be interested in purchasing it.0  Brannan 
indicated that the three men met briefly at a restaurant and then 
went out to Andrulat's car to show Hopkins the gun; as the gun 
was being removed from the trunk, it accidentally discharged, and 
the bullet struck Hopkins in the upper thigh area, severing his 
femoral artery and causing him to bleed to death.    
  Brannan pled guilty to involuntary manslaughter in the 
Court of Common Pleas of Washington County and was sentenced to 
18-60 months, less one day, of imprisonment, which he began to 
serve on June 6, 1994.  On August 30, 1994, nearly two years 
after the underlying incident occurred, Brannan was indicted in 
federal court for having been a felon in possession of a firearm. 
He pled guilty on October 31 and was sentenced on February 10, 
1995.  At the time of his sentencing, Brannan was serving the 
sentence for involuntary manslaughter. 
  The presentence report prepared for sentencing Brannan 
recommended a four-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. 
§ 2K2.1(b)(5), which provides for such an enhancement where the 
                     
0Brannan was on probation at the time.  He had been told by his 
parole officer earlier in the day that he could not keep the gun, 
a .357 handgun which belonged to his wife, in his home. 
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defendant "used or possessed any firearm . . . in connection with 
another felony offense."  The probation officer gave the 
following reason to justify the enhancement: 
During the course of the instant offense, the 
firearm that the defendant possessed discharged, 
striking Mr. Hopkins and killing him.  This 
resulted in the defendant's conviction of 
Involuntary Manslaughter. 
 
  Brannan filed two objections to the presentence report 
prior to sentencing.  First, he objected to the four-level 
enhancement of his offense level under § 2K2.1(b)(5).  Second, he 
argued that he should have been given credit for the time he had 
spent incarcerated in Washington County on the manslaughter 
conviction under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, which would have reduced his 
sentence for the federal offense by several months. 
  In addition to objecting to the presentence report, 
Brannan also requested a downward departure based on his family 
ties, his employment history, and his employment prospects, 
relying upon U.S.S.G. §§ 5K2.0, 5H1.5, and 5H1.6.  The 
government, in turn, requested an upward departure under U.S.S.G. 
§ 4A1.3, arguing that Brannan's criminal history category under-
represented the seriousness of his criminal history. 
  At the time of sentencing, Brannan argued that U.S.S.G. 
§ 2K2.1(b)(5) requires a showing of his intent to use a firearm 
in order for the enhancement to be applicable.  Section 
2K2.1(b)(5) provides that if a defendant used or possessed a 
firearm in connection with another felony or if a defendant 
possessed or transferred a firearm with knowledge or intent that 
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it would be used or possessed in connection with another felony, 
the offense level should be increased by four levels. 
  He argued that the knowledge and intent element in the 
second clause should be interpreted to apply to the concept of 
"used or possessed" in the first clause.  Under Brannan's 
interpretation, the alleged negligent handling of the firearm 
involved in the instant set of facts should not have given rise 
to the four-level increase in offense level.  
  The sentencing judge indicated his concern with 
applying the four-level enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(5) to the 
negligent use of a firearm involved in this set of facts.  In 
applying the section as written, however, he found that no 
element of intent was necessary under the Guidelines, and he 
found no alternative other than to impose the four-level 
enhancement.   
  Brannan next argued that U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c) gave the 
court the authority to impose a sentence to run concurrently with 
his state court sentence from the date when the state sentence 
was imposed, giving credit for time served.  Section 5G1.3(c) 
addresses the situation in which a defendant who is serving an 
undischarged term of imprisonment is being sentenced for another 
crime.  This section, together with the accompanying Commentary 
and Application Notes, sets forth a methodology the court should 
follow in determining the extent to which the second sentence 
should run concurrently with, or consecutive to, the sentence 
already being served.  The government argued that he should serve 
his Guideline sentence for the instant offense concurrently with 
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the remainder of the unexpired term of imprisonment for this 
state conviction. 
  The sentencing court determined that the applicable 
offense level of 25 and criminal history category of V for the 
weapon possession offense gave rise to a Guideline sentencing 
range of 100 to 120 months.  The court acknowledged that the 
issue was governed by § 5G1.3(c) but framed this issue as a 
choice of either a consecutive or a concurrent sentence, with a 
related question as to whether "credit" could be given for time 
already served on the state sentence.   
  The court appears to have read § 5G1.3(c) as indicating 
that if the court felt an incremental punishment was required, 
then the sentence should run consecutively, otherwise it should 
be concurrent.  See Appendix, pp. 118-20.  The court could find 
no authority whereby it could "give credit" for the state 
sentence.0  See Appendix, pp. 124-25.  It concluded therefore 
that the sentence it would give -- the minimum it believed it 
could give, namely, 100 months -- would be concurrent with the 
remainder of the state sentence.  See Appendix, pp. 119, 120, 
125.  In making its ruling, the court did not refer to the 
                     
0The district court repeatedly noted its discomfort with the 
length of sentence to be imposed: "I do think that the sentence 
presented here is one heck of a wack [sic]"; "My only difficulty 
is the difficulty, I think, with the duration of it.  The 
guideline is longer than what I would impose were the discretion 
in me"; "I'm not sure there needs to be incremental punishments 
for that fortuitous event when we're talking about a sentence as 
serious as this one.  I wish that all of the violent criminals I 
prosecuted in the days that I was a prosecutor had gotten tagged 
with as much time as what Mr. Brannan is going to get merely for 
this charge"; "If anything, the federal sentence is the tail 
wagging the dog."  Appendix, pp. 119, 120, 125, 136. 
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Commentary to the Guidelines, or the sentencing methodology under 
§ 5G1.3(c) described in Application Note 3 thereof, nor did it 
have the benefit of this court's opinion in United States v. 
Holifield, 53 F.3d 11 (3d Cir. 1995), as to how that methodology 
can or should be applied.     
  Brannan also argued that the two-year delay in bringing 
the charges should be taken into account and also presented 
evidence as to the innocent nature of this incident and his 
character as an employed and responsible family man as grounds 
for a departure.  The court rejected these considerations as not 
sufficient to warrant any relief for Brannan under the 
Guidelines.0     
  As indicated above, on appeal Brannan presses the need 
for a finding of intent as a prerequisite for the four-level 
enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(5) and raises the implications of 
Holifield on the sentencing in this case.  The government 
counters that the plain meaning of the Guidelines supports the 
enhancement.  Further, the government focuses its opposition to 
Brannan's argument under § 5G1.3(c) on his failure at sentencing 
to request a "downward departure" for time served in prison and 
its view that the sentencing court properly applied § 5G1.3(c).   
 
DISCUSSION 
I. 
                     
0Brannan does not challenge these rulings on appeal. 
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  The district court's interpretation of the Guidelines 
and the extent of its power to depart downward are legal 
questions subject to plenary review.  See United States v. 
Holifield, 53 F.3d 11, 12-13 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. 
Higgins, 967 F.2d 841, 844 (3d Cir. 1992).  However, if a 
defendant has failed to request a departure and first raises the 
issue on appeal, our review of the record is limited to a 
determination of whether plain error had been committed.  See 
United States v. Pardo, 25 F.3d 1187, 1193 (3d Cir. 1994). 
  The government argues that we should apply the "plain 
error" standard of review to the issue raised under § 5G1.3(c), 
arguing that Brannan did not specifically request a "downward 
departure" before the district court under that Guideline, and 
the issue is being raised for the first time on appeal.  The 
government does concede, however, that Brannan requested 
application of § 5G1.3(c) to grant him 18 months' credit for time 
served.  See Appendix, pp. 121-23.   
  We find Brannan's request that his existing sentence 
and time served be taken into account was sufficient to preserve 
this issue on appeal.  We will not require recitation of magic 
words, or specific request for departure, in connection with 
§5G1.3, especially because, as is discussed more fully below, the 
ability of the court to depart under § 5G1.3(c) is inherent in 
the section itself.  That is, departure may be the result of the 
court's application of the methodology under this section, rather 
than an extraneous factor to be applied or considered after the 
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appropriate sentence has been determined.0  Further, the 
relationship between § 5G1.3(c) and departures had not yet been 
explored by this Court in Holifield at the time this sentencing 
occurred.  We conclude, therefore, that plenary review of both 
issues raised is warranted.   
 
 
II. 
  The first issue presented is whether § 2K2.1(b)(5) 
requires that the "use or possession" be intentional.  If intent 
is necessary, the alleged negligent use or possession of the 
firearm in this instance would not have resulted in application 
of this section, and Brannan would not have received a four-level 
enhancement of his offense level.  Section 2K2.1(b)(5) of the 
Guidelines provides: 
If the defendant used or possessed any firearm or 
ammunition in connection with another felony 
offense; or possessed or transferred any firearm 
or ammunition with knowledge, intent, or reason to 
believe that it would be used or possessed in 
connection with another felony offense, increase 
by 4 levels. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5). 
 
                     
0The concept of departure in § 5G1.3(c) seems to vary slightly 
from the concept elsewhere in the Guidelines.  A departure under 
this section means that the court recognizes time already served 
for another offense if and to the extent appropriate.  For 
example, by imposing a 24-month sentence where the Guideline 
sentence for the second offense calls for a 48-month sentence but 
the defendant has served 36 months on another charge, the court 
does not reduce the punishment as such based on some extraneous 
factor.  Instead, it arrives at an appropriate sentence by 
recognizing punishment for one crime as serving the purpose of 
punishment for another. 
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  Brannan makes three arguments: 
  First, he argues that the semicolon in this section 
should be ignored and the word "or" be read to mean "in other 
words."   
  Second, he contends that use or possession "in 
connection with" another felony implies an element of intent.  
  Third, he relies upon Staples v. United States, 114 
S. Ct. 1793 (1994), and Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655 
(1994), for the proposition that before imposing this incremental 
punishment, mens rea is required for the underlying felony.   
  The court at sentencing was unsure of the policy behind 
this Guideline but felt certain both that its meaning was clear 
and that it applied to Brannan's conduct.  We too have little 
difficulty in determining that the plain meaning of the provision 
applies to Brannan and that the provision cannot be read to 
include, imply, or otherwise require that the use or possession 
was with the intent to commit a crime.  We view "or" as a 
disjunctive, connecting phrases with different meanings.  See 
Reiter v. Sanotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979).  What follows 
the "or" in § 2K2.1(b)(5) is not merely an explication of what 
preceded it, as Brannan urges. 
  That the Sentencing Commission intended that "or" be 
read as a disjunctive term is clear upon review of the amendments 
made to § 2K2.1 since its adoption.  Section 2K2.1 initially 
provided for an increased offense level "[i]f the defendant used 
the firearm in committing or attempting another offense."  See 
U.S.S.G. Appendix C, Amendment 189.  An amendment to this 
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Guideline provided for an increased sentence "[i]f the defendant 
used or possessed the firearm in connection with commission or 
attempted commission of another offense."  Id.  A separate 
Guideline was introduced "to address transfer of a weapon with 
intent or knowledge that it will be used to commit another 
offense."  Id.   On November 1, 1991, these Guidelines were 
consolidated and became § 2K2.1(b)(5).  The first part of 
§ 2K2.1(b)(5) addresses use or possession of a firearm in 
connection with another felony; the second part addresses 
attempts and transfers.  See U.S.S.G., Appendix C, Amendment 374. 
Accordingly, the Sentencing Commission intended § 2K2.1 to 
provide for a four-level enhancement for two different types of 
conduct.   
  As to the contention that "in connection with" another 
felony implies an element of intent, we can divine no such 
implication.  We agree with other circuit courts which have 
considered the issue that "terms used within the federal 
sentencing guidelines and not specifically defined therein 
generally should be given their common usage."  United States v. 
DeLuca, 17 F.3d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1994).  Thus, "connection," as 
used in section § 2K2.1(b)(5), is defined as a "causal or logical 
relation or sequence."  Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 
278 (1990).  We find that the plain meaning of "in connection 
with" in § 2K2.1(b)(5) does not suggest that criminal intent need 
be shown in order to apply this sentencing enhancement provision. 
We thus reject Brannan's first two arguments as contrary to the 
plain language and meaning of the section.  
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  Brannan's last argument is premised upon two Supreme 
Court cases which are easily distinguishable.  Staples and 
Ratzlaf dealt with the requisite intention for conviction of a 
crime, not for purposes of imposing an enhanced sentence under 
the Guidelines.  They are clearly inapposite.  Brannan has not 
cited, and we cannot find, any authority for the proposition that 
mens rea must exist in connection with a particular attribute or 
behavior that will result in enhancement of an offense level for 
purposes of sentencing.  Further, we are unwilling to read this 
requirement into the Guidelines.  We find, therefore, that the 
district court properly enhanced the offense level under 
§ 2K2.1(b)(5). 
 
III. 
  The second issue presented by Brannan involves the 
application of § 5G1.3(c) of the Guidelines, recently explored by 
this Court in Holifield.  As indicated above, § 5G1.3 addresses 
the situation in which a defendant already subject to an 
undischarged term of imprisonment is being sentenced for another 
offense.0  Before the district court and on appeal, Brannan 
                     
0Section 5G1.3 has three subsections.  Subsection (c) applies if 
(a) and (b) do not.  Section 5G1.3(a) provides that if the second 
offense was committed while defendant was serving, or after 
sentencing but before service of, a term of imprisonment, the 
sentence for the second offense is to run consecutively from the 
sentence for the first offense.  Section 5G1.3(b) provides that 
if (a) does not apply and if the offense giving rise to the 
undischarged term of imprisonment was fully taken into account in 
determining the offense level for the second offense, then the 
sentence for the second offense shall run concurrently to the 
undischarged term of imprisonment.  Section 5G1.3(c) is labeled a 
"Policy Statement"; we note that "[t]he policy statements and 
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argued that subsection (c) applies to the instant situation.0 
Subsection (c) provides: 
[T]he sentence for the instant offense shall be 
imposed to run consecutively to the prior 
undischarged term of imprisonment to the extent 
necessary to achieve a reasonable incremental 
punishment for the instant offense. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c). 
  The trial judge read the section literally and, finding 
no basis for incremental punishment, sentenced Brannan to the 
Guideline sentence for the instant offense -- 100 months, at the 
lowest end of the sentencing range -- to run concurrent with the 
undischarged term being served for the manslaughter conviction. 
The trial judge did not believe he had the power to do anything 
else.  See Appendix, pp. 124-25. 
  Section 5G1.3(c) is a Policy Statement that is further 
explored and explained in the Commentary to the Guidelines.0  As 
is reflected in the Commentary to § 5G1.3(c), specifically 
Application Note 3, the sentence that the court imposes under 
this section should be the result of a methodology that can 
produce a sentence different from that required by the strict 
application of the Guideline criminal offense level and criminal 
history category of the isolated second offense.   Application 
Note 3 indicates that the court should examine the sentence that 
                                                                  
commentary contained in the guidelines are binding on the federal 
courts."  United States v. Holifield, 53 F.3d 11, 13 n.2 (3d Cir. 
1995). 
0We therefore do not address the question whether U.S.S.G. 
§5G1.3(b) applies to this case. 
0As noted above, both the Policy Statements and the Commentary in 
the Sentencing Guidelines are binding on the federal courts. See 
United States v. Holifield, 53 F.3d 11, 13 n.2 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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would have resulted if all of the offenses -- in this instance, 
the manslaughter offense and the possession of a firearm by a 
convicted felon -- had been federal offenses for which sentences 
were being imposed at the same time under § 5G1.2.  See U.S.S.G. 
§ 5G1.2 (Sentencing on Multiple Counts of Conviction).   
  This determination can require an approximation.  As 
noted in the Application Note, where the sentence being served is 
a state sentence, as in the instant situation, information 
available may permit only a rough estimate of the total 
punishment that would have been imposed under the Guidelines. The 
methodology calls for the court to engage in a fiction, that is, 
to approach sentencing as if both offenses were being sentenced 
at once. 
  Once the court determines -- whether by approximation, 
estimation, or otherwise -- what sentence would be called for 
under the Guidelines, the court then examines whether, in view of 
the sentence that would have resulted, some incremental 
punishment for the instant offense is warranted.  This 
incremental punishment is apparently intended to add consecutive 
punishment where the sentence already imposed for the prior 
offense would not suffice as the total sentence using § 5G1.2, so 
that some recognition of the incremental effect of the later 
offense, consecutive to the original sentence, is warranted. 
  As noted in Holifield, the result of these calculations 
can, however, be a departure; that is, the sentence actually 
imposed for the second offense, which results from the 
methodology discussed above, can be different from, and in some 
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instances less than, what would otherwise have been called for 
under strict application of the Guidelines in sentencing for the 
second offense alone.  The focus of this Guideline section is to 
determine the appropriate sentence, and if as a result the 
sentence is less than the Guideline sentence for the second 
offense, the Guidelines and Holifield permit -- but do not 
require or even encourage -- this result. 
  In the instant setting, the application of this 
methodology could have led to a different result.  As sentenced, 
Brannan will serve a total of 108 months for the two offenses.0 
Under the methodology advocated by the Commentary, the court 
could have determined, hypothetically, that the Guideline 
sentence for manslaughter and gun possession, if sentenced 
together, would have been 100 months; that no incremental penalty 
was warranted and therefore a concurrent sentence was called for; 
and that because Brannan had already served eight months for the 
first offense, it would sentence him to only 92 months for the 
second offense (to run concurrently with the remaining 
undischarged term, and consecutive thereafter).0 
                     
0Brannan started serving his manslaughter sentence on June 6, 
1994 and was sentenced to serve 100 months for the second offense 
on February 10, 1995, concurrent with the remainder of the first 
offense term. 
0This court noted in Holifield that while departure from the 
Guidelines was not required, the General Counsel to the 
Sentencing Commission had stated in a letter to a United States 
Probation Officer that it could be justified: 
Occasionally, a downward departure may be necessary to 
make this provision work properly.  For example, where 
the defendant has been in state custody for a long 
time, a downward departure may be the only feasible way 
to achieve an appropriate total punishment, assuming 
17 
  The Commentary states that the "methodology does not, 
itself, require the court to depart from the guideline range 
established for the instant federal offense."  U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 
(Commentary).  However, as noted by the court in Holifield, the 
court can depart if the court believes it should do so in order 
to arrive at the appropriate sentence.0  Each case will be 
different, depending on the application of the methodology to the 
facts.  
  Therefore, this methodology rests discretion in the 
trial court in the "as if" scenario, to take into account both 
offenses, how they would be treated under § 5G1.2 if they were 
multiple counts, and whether incremental punishment is necessary. 
If the sentencing court engages in this exercise as recommended 
by the methodology, it is not constrained by the concept of 
"giving credit" for prior time but can give recognition to time 
served by following the procedures suggested.  The result of the 
methodology dictates the attributes of the appropriate sentence. 
The examples set forth in the Illustrations following the 
Application Notes clarify the methodology. 
                                                                  
the court wishes to employ a departure to achieve the 
desired objective. 
Holifield, 53 F.3d at 14 n.5 (citation omitted). 
0Other circuits agree that courts may depart from the Guideline 
sentencing range under § 5G1.3(c) when sufficient justification 
exists.  See United States v. Whiteley, 54 F.3d 85, 91 (2d Cir. 
1995) (stating that a court may impose a sentence lower than the 
sentencing range if it departs downward); United States v. 
Gullickson, 981 F.2d 344, 349 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that 
district court may depart from sentencing range if sufficient 
justification exists). 
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  We indicated in Holifield that the sentencing court is 
not required to apply the methodology and is not required to 
depart.  In the instant case, the sentencing court clearly was 
uncomfortable with the length of sentence and was searching for a 
way to reduce it.  However, that court believed it had no power 
to sentence Brannan to anything other than the applicable 
Guideline sentence for the second offense to run concurrent from 
the date of sentencing.  See supra, n. 5.  We conclude that the 
district court did have the power to depart under the § 5G1.3(c) 
methodology, and we therefore will remand so that the district 
court will have the opportunity to vacate the sentence and 
resentence consistent with this opinion. 
_________________________ 
